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THE COMMON LAW CHOICE OF LAW RULES FOR RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUSTS 
 
ADELINE CHONG* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a dearth of authority and in-depth discussion as to what are the choice of law rules for claims 
involving the assertion that property is held on a resulting or constructive trust. It is usually thought that 
the choice of law rules set out by the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
Recognition (hereafter the “Hague Trusts Convention”), as enacted into English law by the Recognition 
of Trusts Act 1987, apply.1 However, it is arguable that this is not so for some types of resulting and 
constructive trusts, namely those governed by a foreign law; or, at the very least, that some doubt exists as 
to whether the Hague choice of law rules apply to all resulting and constructive trusts. It is therefore 
important that the common law choice of law rules for such trusts are clearly elucidated. Unfortunately, 
this is an area of the law that is distinctly undeveloped. The aim of this paper is to consider what are or 
should be the common law choice of law rules for resulting and constructive trusts.  
Two different types of claims must first be distinguished. Sometimes no clear line is drawn 
between claims that the transferee is personally liable to account as a constructive trustee and claims 
involving an assertion that property is held on constructive trust because the transferor has equitable title 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law, University of Nottingham. I would like to thank Professor Jonathan Harris, Professor Andrew 
Simester, Professor James Fawcett and Professor Craig Rotherham for comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
All errors remain my own. 
1 E.g. D. Hayton, Underhill and Hayton : Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees (London : Butterworths) (16th edn, 
2003) (hereafter “Underhill and Hayton”), pp. 1020-1022. 
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to the property. The former type of claim involves situations such as where a wrongdoer dishonestly 
assists in a breach of trust2 or knowingly receives trust property in breach of trust;3 or where a fiduciary 
puts himself in a position where there is the possibility of conflict between his interest and the interest of 
the trust.4 A constructive trusteeship that is imposed in these situations concerns the wrongdoer’s or 
fiduciary’s personal liability to account for the losses caused to the trust, or profits obtained by exploiting 
his fiduciary position. It is, as Moffat terms it, ‘a propertyless phenomenon’.5 In contrast, claims 
involving the assertion of a ‘constructive trust’, as opposed to ‘constructive trusteeship’, would arise 
when property is transferred pursuant to a contract which subsequently fails;6 or in a dispute over 
ownership of the family home upon the breakdown of a relationship.7 These constructive trusts claims 
have as their basis the claimant’s proprietary entitlement to the property. The same proprietary basis is 
present when a resulting trust is claimed over property. Resulting trusts give effect to the parties’ 
intentions; thus one arises where the claimant has contributed towards the purchase price of property 
which is legally in another’s name as it is presumed that the claimant did not intend to make a gift to the 
legal owner.8 It must be made clear that this paper will focus on these latter, proprietary-based, types of 
claims. The phrase ‘trusts claims’ where used below must be understood to refer to these types of claims. 
 
II. THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE RECOGNITION OF TRUSTS ACT 1987 
 
A. A question of construction 
 
                                                 
2 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378. 
3 BCCI v. Akindele [2001] Ch. 437.  
4 Guinness plc v. Saunders [1990] 2 A.C. 663.  
5 Trusts Law Text and Materials (London : Butterworths) (3rd edn, 1999), p. 553. The inappropriateness of the 
terminology of ‘constructive trustee’ with respect to a personal remedy has been remarked upon : Paragon 
Finance v. DB Thakerar and Co. [1999] 1 All E.R. 400 at 409. 
6 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale  v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] A.C. 669 (hereafter 
“Westdeutsche”). 
7 Lloyd’s Bank plc v. Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 107. 
8 Midland Bank v. Cooke [1995] 4 All E.R. 562. 
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The Hague Trusts Convention has generated much debate and comment.9 It is unnecessary for the 
purposes of this paper to delve at length into the detail of the Convention; only those provisions that are 
relevant will be looked at. Article 6 of the Hague Trusts Convention dictates that a trust shall be governed 
by the law chosen, expressly or impliedly, by the settlor. This law need not have any objective connection 
with the trust. In the absence of choice, Article 7 provides that the trust ‘shall be governed by the law with 
which it is most closely connected.’ It then goes on to list several factors that shall be considered in 
ascertaining the law of closest connection to the trust : the place of administration of the trust designated 
by the settlor; the situs of the assets of the trust; the place of residence or business of the trustee; and the 
objects of the trust and the places where they are to be fulfilled. This list is not comprehensive.10 
The Hague Trusts Convention’s choice of law rules are geared towards express trusts : Article 3 
states that the Convention applies ‘only to trusts created voluntarily and evidenced in writing.’ However, 
Article 20 enables a Contracting State to extend the scope of the Convention ‘to trusts declared by judicial 
decisions.’ The United Kingdom has availed itself of this opportunity. Section 1(2) of the Recognition of 
Trusts Act 1987 extends the ambit of the Hague Trusts Convention to ‘any other trusts of property arising 
under the law of any part of the United Kingdom or by virtue of a judicial decision whether in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere.’ The fact that the exact wording of Article 20 is not reproduced in section 1(2) 
raises problems. In the House of Lords debates, the Lord Chancellor stated that : ‘The extension to trusts 
arising by virtue of judicial decision includes any trusts that are either declared by a court or are created  
                                                 
9 E.g. J. Harris, The Hague Trusts Convention (Oxford : Hart Publishing) (2002); A. Dyer, “International 
Recognition and Adaptation of Trusts : The Influence of the Hague Convention” (1999) 32 Vand. J. Trans. Law 
989; E. Gaillard and D.T. Trautman, “Trusts in Non-Trust Countries : Conflict of Laws and the Hague 
Convention on Trusts” (1987) 35 Am. J. Comp. Law 307; D. Hayton, “The Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition” (1987) 36 I.C.L.Q. 260; H. Kötz, “The Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition” in D. Hayton (ed.), Modern Developments in Trust Law 
(The Hague : Kluwer) (1999), Chapter 3; M. Lupoi, Trusts : A Comparative Study (Milan : Giuffre) (1997), 
translated by S. Dix (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) (2000), Chapter 6; M. Lupoi, “The Shapeless 
Trust” (1995) 3 Trusts and Trustees 15; J. Schoenblum, “The Hague Convention on Trusts : Much Ado About 
Very Little” (1994) 3  J. Int. Trust & Corp. Plan. 5; A.G. Paton and R. Grasso, “The Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition : Implementation in Italy” (1994) 43 I.C.L.Q. 654.  
10 A. E. von Overbeck, “Explanatory Report”, para. 77, p. 387 (hereafter the “von Overbeck Report”). 
  4 
pursuant to an order of the court.’11 The intention behind section 1(2) thus appears to have been to catch 
all resulting and constructive trusts within its scope. 
However, it is debatable whether the legislation succeeds in doing so. The first limb of section 
1(2) brings resulting and constructive trusts that are governed by English law within the Convention’s 
scope. However, the case for the inclusion of foreign trusts is not as clear-cut. The problem centres on the 
word ‘arising’. An institutional constructive trust arises upon the occurrence of certain events; the court’s 
role is merely to declare that such a trust has arisen in the past.12 The court decision is therefore a mere 
affirmation of an existing fact and it could not be said that the trust ‘arose’ from the judicial decision.13 
Likewise, the presumption underlying a presumed resulting trust14 arises from the moment of transfer of 
property itself.15 The court’s role is again only to declare a pre-existing trust. In view of this, it is 
surprising that the wording of section 1(2) was not amended, as it could easily have been, to make it clear 
that it covers both trusts ‘declared’ by a court and those ‘arising’ by virtue of a judicial decision if that 
was the object of the extension.  
As matters stand, considerable ambiguity lies as to whether the Hague choice of law rules should 
be applied to all resulting and constructive trusts.16 On the one hand, the authors of Underhill and Hayton 
support a purposive interpretation of section 1(2); that is, they think that both trusts which are ‘declared’ 
or which ‘arise’ from a judicial decision would be covered by the second limb.17 On the other hand, Harris 
                                                 
11 Hansard H.L. Debs vol. 482, col. 940. 
12 Westdeutsche [1996] A.C. 669 at 716, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
13 In contrast, the remedial constructive trust are imposed at the court’s discretion and therefore only arises at the 
moment of judgment : Rawluk v. Rawluk (1990) 65 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 185. It therefore clearly falls within the scope 
of section 1(2). The remedial constructive trust is currently not part of English domestic law : Westdeutsche, ibid.; 
Re Polly Peck (No. 2) [1998] 3 All E.R. 812. 
14 Automatic resulting trusts, which arise upon the failure of express trusts or when the purposes of the express trusts 
have been fulfilled, fall within the Convention : von Overbeck Report, para. 51, pp. 380-381. The phrase ‘resulting 
trust’ used here refers only to the presumed resulting trust unless indicated otherwise. 
15 See Pearce and Stevens The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations (London : LexisNexis Butterworths) 
(3rd edn, 2002), Chapter 8 (esp. pp. 233-242). 
16 In Lightning v. Lightning Electrical Contractors Ltd, 23/4/1998 (unreported), Gibson L.J. left open the question 
whether the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 applied to presumed resulting trusts. 
17 They point out that Article 20, from which section 1(2) originates, refers to ‘trusts declared by judicial decisions.’ 
However, the French version of Article 20 uses the word ‘créés’ which appears to mean a trust imposed by the court 
: M. Lupoi, Trusts : A Comparative Study,  (Milan, 1997), supra, fn 9, p. 343; Harris, supra, fn 9, footnote 240, p. 
139 (The official versions of the Convention are available in both English and French). 
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prefers a more literal approach.18 The literal construction is impliedly supported by Dicey and Morris as 
well since they regard constructive trusts as falling within the subject of restitution,19 and note that ‘it is 
far from clear’ whether resulting trusts that are not of the automatic type ‘will be caught’ within the scope 
of the Act.20  
In the absence of judicial guidance, it is difficult to determine which is the correct position to 
take. The answer as to which is the more appropriate construction of section 1(2) may therefore lie in 
considering arguments of principle. 
 
B. Should the Act apply? 
 
The question is : in principle, should the Act be applicable to resulting and constructive trusts? 
Harris has noted that the Convention appears to treat trusts as part of the law of obligations as it 
parallels the contractual choice of law rules set out in the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations.21 Emphasis is put upon settlor autonomy, in the same way that emphasis is put 
upon party autonomy in the Rome Convention. Insofar as express trusts are concerned, this approach is 
legitimate as it serves to uphold the intentions of the settlor and protect expectations. However, resulting 
and constructive trusts are, by their nature, less amenable to the ‘settlor autonomy’ approach.22 They arise 
by operation of law in response to a particular set of events and ‘are not direct products of properly 
manifested intentions to create them.’23 It is artificial to speak of ‘settlor autonomy’ with respect to a 
resulting or constructive trust in these instances. One may attempt to argue that a choice of law expressed 
in a failed contract which consequentially gives rise to a trust over property transferred pursuant to the 
                                                 
18 Ibid., pp. 145-148. 
19 Collins (gen. ed.), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (London : Sweet & Maxwell) (13th edn, 2000) 
(hereafter “Dicey and Morris”), para. 29-026, p. 1096. 
20 Ibid., para. 29-003, pp. 1087-1088. 
21 Supra, fn 9, pp. 166-169.  
22 Automatic resulting trusts are not included in this criticism as a choice of law in a trust instrument setting out an 
express trust which fails could safely be regarded as an indicator of the settlor’s intentions as to the applicable law of 
the consequent automatic resulting trust. 
23 R. Chambers, “Constructive Trusts in Canada (Pt 1)” (2001) 15 Trust Law International 214 at 222. 
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failed contract may serve as an indication of the intentions of the ‘settlor’ as to the governing law of the 
trust under Article 6. However, this would be misguided as party expectations as to the governing law of 
the contract does not translate into party expectations as to the governing law of any consequent trust that 
may arise upon the failure of that contract.24  
It is suggested that in principle, the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 should not apply to resulting 
and constructive trusts. The choice of law rules therein were not formulated with a view to applying to 
such trusts; hence, not surprisingly, the rules are inappropriate. The fact that the first limb of section 1(2) 
does extend the scope of the Hague Trusts Convention to resulting and constructive trusts that are 
governed by English law is regrettable. Such trusts do not fit in comfortably with the Hague Trusts 
Convention’s obligation-based framework. Any attempts to extend its influence further should be 
resisted. The ambiguity in the wording of the second limb of section 1(2) should therefore be seized upon 
so that, at the very least, resulting and constructive trusts that are governed by a foreign law should not be 
regarded as being subjected to the Hague choice of law rules. The arguments of principle that are made 
here support a literal construction of the statute. On this footing, the common law rules governing trusts 
become important.  
 
III. COMMON LAW RULES : PRELIMINARY POINTS 
 
There is a distinct dearth of literature and authority on the common law choice of law rules for trusts. 
Most of the limited attention that has been given in this area has focused on express trusts,25 leaving the 
conflict of law aspects of resulting and constructive trusts largely uncharted territory. Before considering 
the choice of law rules for such trusts, a couple of preliminary points must be made. 
                                                 
24 Even if such expectations were present, it is argued that they should take a back-seat. As will be shown below, 
trusts properly belong within the law of property and should be treated as proprietary rights. The policy 
considerations present when dealing with property rights dictate that party expectations, if present, are to be 
relegated to the background. 
25 P.E.N. Croucher, “Trusts of Moveables in Private International Law” (1940-41) 4 M.L.R. 111; D.F. Cavers, 
“Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws” (1930-31) 44 Harv. L.R. 161; V.T.H. Delany, “Charitable Trusts and 
the Conflict of Laws” (1961) 10 I.C.L.Q. 385. 
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A. Characterisation 
 
It is important to note that resulting and constructive trusts are not causes of action, but rather responses 
to causes of action. The orthodox position is that it is the cause of action, or issue at stake,26 that is 
classified and not the remedy. Thus, accordingly, the subject for characterisation is the event which gives 
rise to the trust and not the trust itself. For example, a trust arising over a mistaken payment could be seen 
to arise to reverse the recipient’s unjust enrichment;27 and therefore according to the orthodox view of 
characterisation, the unjust enrichment choice of law rules should apply to govern the consequential 
trust.28  
Stevens, however, rejects the proposition that the most appropriate choice of law rule for trusts 
hinges on whether they properly belong to the law of trusts, the law of property, or the law of unjust 
enrichment.29 It is submitted that he is correct. The law of restitution is still developing and as Stevens 
points out, classification under English domestic law is a controversial issue.30 Part of the debate involves 
the question whether the transferee can be said to be ‘enriched’ at the transferor’s expense when the latter 
retains equitable title to the property.31 Added to this is the uncertainty as to whether unjust enrichment 
comprises of merely personal claims, or includes actions where the claimant is asserting proprietary rights 
                                                 
26 Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 W.L.R. 387.  
27 Burrows, The Law of Restitution (London : Butterworths) (2nd edn, 2002), p. 66, argues that the constructive 
trust imposed over the mistaken payment in Chase Manhattan v. Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch. 105 (facts 
infra, text to fn 38) should be seen as an example of proprietary restitution reversing unjust enrichment; and 
indeed, Goulding J.’s judgment makes extensive reference to the law of restitution and the circumstances under 
which constructive trusts arise under New York law, New York law being agreed by both parties to be the 
applicable law of the claim. However, this case is weak support for the application of the unjust enrichment rule 
to trusts claims; see infra, text to fn 79. 
28 G. Panagopoulos, Restitution in Private International Law (Oxford : Hart Publishing) (2000), p. 70; J. Bird, 
“Choice of Law” in F. Rose (ed.), Restitution and the Conflict of Laws (Oxford : Mansfield Press) (1995), pp. 82-83.  
29 “Resulting Trusts in the Conflict of Laws” in P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Restitution and Equity, Vol. 1, Resulting 
Trusts and Equitable Compensation (London : Mansfield Press) (2000), p. 153. 
30 Ibid.  
31 See W. Swadling, “A Claim in Restitution?” [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 63; A. Tettenborn, “Restitution of property not 
belonging to one : more awkward than it looks?”, WG Hart Workshops, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1-3 
July 2002. Cf. R.B. Grantham and C.E.F. Rickett, “Restitution, Property and Ignorance – A Reply to Mr Swadling” 
[1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 463.  
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(as would be the case for a trusts claim).32 The latter, commonly known as claims for proprietary 
restitution, are on the one hand described to be based on the principle of reversing the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment;33 and on the other hand, argued to have nothing to do with unjust enrichment but are based on 
the vindication of the claimant’s proprietary entitlement and hence within the law of property.34 No 
conclusive answer as to the basis for claims of proprietary restitution can yet be asserted.35 
What is the relevance of the taxonomy of domestic English law at the conflicts level? While it is 
generally accepted that characterisation in private international law is to be carried out by reference to the 
lex fori, what is applied here is an ‘enlightened lex fori’;36 that is, domestic characterisations are not 
applied rigidly. Claims which are unknown under foreign law will be classified in accordance with the 
closest analogous domestic equivalent.37 Hence, although characterisation in private international law is 
not a mirror image of the domestic characterisation of claims, the classifications under domestic law exert 
a highly persuasive influence at the conflicts level. This means that the uncertainty in the domestic law of 
restitution inevitably affects the situation at the private international law level. The lack of widespread 
agreement as to what is the proper cause of action for a trusts claim impinges on the characterisation 
process. One cannot be sure in which ‘box’ the claim properly belongs. It follows that depending on the 
characterisation of the indeterminate cause of action as a means of identifying the choice of law rule is not 
the most sensible option to take.  
                                                 
32 G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford : Clarendon Press) (1999), Chapter 20; Grantham and 
Rickett, ibid. Cf. A. Burrows, “Proprietary Restitution : Unmasking Unjust Enrichment” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 412; P. 
Millett, “Restitution and Constructive Trusts” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 399.  
33 Burrows, ibid.; and supra, fn 27, pp. 60-75. 
34 Virgo, supra, fn 32, pp. 11-15, p. 591. 
35 Although the decision of the majority of the House of Lords decision in Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 
102 can be seen as support for the latter construction. Lord Goff and G. Jones, Goff & Jones : The Law of 
Restitution (London : Sweet & Maxwell) (6th edn, 2002), go further and argue that Foskett ‘leads to the firm 
conclusion that English law does not recognise a restitutionary proprietary claim’ (para. 2-007, p. 86; emphasis 
in original). See also NABB Brothers Ltd v. Lloyd’s Bank International (Guernsey) Ltd [2005] EWHC 405, 
para. 36. 
36 O. Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International Law (Leyden : Sitjhoff) (1976), p. 231; cited by 
C. Forsyth, “Characterisation Revisited : An Essay in the Theory of the English Conflict of Laws” (1998) 114 
L.Q.R. 141, at 153. The ‘enlightened lex fori’ approach is supported by Auld L.J. in Macmillan Inc. v. 
Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 W.L.R. 387 at 407. 
37 Re Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch. 394. 
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It is suggested that the better approach is to focus on the response and to characterise the 
response; in other words, to classify trusts claims by reference to the underlying nature of constructive 
and resulting trusts. This method goes against conflicts orthodoxy. However, in view of the uncertainty 
plaguing the proper classification of trusts claims, choosing to characterise the response is the obvious 
alternative to choosing to characterise the cause of action, on which there is no consensus. In addition, it 
will be shown below that this unorthodoxy is wholly justified when the true nature of resulting and 
constructive trusts claims is revealed.  
  
B. Procedural or substantive? 
 
Another issue that arises is whether a trust should be considered as substantive, and hence governed by 
the lex causae, or remedial, and hence governed by the lex fori as being a procedural matter. In Chase 
Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd,38 the plaintiff, a New York bank, had paid $2 
million by mistake to another New York bank for the account of the defendant bank, which carried on 
business in London. While both parties agreed that New York law applied to the claim, the defendant 
argued that the imposition of a constructive trust should be governed by English law as a remedial matter 
for the lex fori. Goulding J. disagreed; his Lordship concluded that the imposition of a constructive trust 
was a matter of substantive law governed by New York law.39 Furthermore, Canadian40 courts have also 
shown themselves ready to treat trusts claims as raising substantive issues; this is so even though Canada 
also acknowledges the concept of the remedial constructive trust. As is obvious from the name itself, such 
trusts are considered as remedial devices and their imposition is at the discretion of the court.41 
It is submitted that this is the correct approach. First, the remedial nature of resulting and 
constructive trusts is subordinate to the claim itself. This is illustrated by Chase Manhattan where 
                                                 
38 [1981] Ch. 105 (hereafter “Chase Manhattan”).  
39 Ibid., at 127.  
40 Pettkus v. Becker (1981) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257. 
41  See L. Barnard, “Choice of Law in Equitable Wrongs : A Comparative Analysis” [1992] C.L.J. 474, at 475-478. 
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Goulding J. was not content to treat the imposition of a trust as being the ‘mere result of a remedial or 
procedural rule.’42 A parallel situation can be found in Article 10(1)(c) of the Rome Convention, which 
provides that the assessment of damages for breach of contract is to be treated as raising a substantive 
matter and governed by the choice of law rule for contract. This shows that questions that may 
instinctively be thought of as being ‘remedial’ could be classified as being substantive in nature. 
Secondly, even if trusts can be considered as remedial devices, it does not automatically follow that they 
should be governed by the lex fori. As Castel has pointed out, ‘not all questions of remedy are purely 
procedural. Often a remedy is predicated on and serves to vindicate a substantive right.’43  
In fact, it is arguable that resulting and constructive trusts are much more than remedial devices. 
This is most obvious when one looks at the English notion of a resulting or constructive trust which is not 
imposed by the courts but arises automatically when a certain factual situation exists.44 For example, a 
resulting trust over the family home which is in the husband’s sole name will arise in favour of the wife if 
she had contributed to the purchase price.45 The law does not retrospectively award her a proprietary 
interest that is proportionate to her contribution; her share arises from the moment of her contribution 
itself. Resulting and constructive trusts are in reality a response to, not a remedy for, certain events and 
the response is very much tied up with the substantive right being asserted. It is the nature of the right 
asserted which holds the key as to the choice of law rule to govern trusts claims.46  
 
IV. THE COMMON LAW RULES : THE POSSIBLE APPROACHES 
 
It is suggested that three main approaches could be adopted in order to determine the choice of law rule 
for trusts. The two extreme positions are to consider trusts as either part of the law of obligations, or part 
                                                 
42 Chase Manhattan [1981] Ch. 105 at 127. 
43 Canadian Conflict of Laws (Toronto : Butterworths) (4th edn, 1997), p. 147. 
44 Underhill and Hayton, p. 1022; Pearce and Stevens, supra, fn 15, pp. 233-242, p. 264. 
45 Unless it is shown that her contribution was meant as a gift to her husband, in which case, the husband owns 
the property solely. 
46 See Barnard, supra, fn 41, 476; Castel, supra, fn 43, p. 550. 
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of the law of property. The flexible mid-way approach would take into consideration both the obligatory 
and proprietary characteristics of the trust. Each of these three approaches will be analysed in turn. 
 
A. Trusts as obligations 
 
Within this heading, one can discern three further sub-approaches. First is to adopt the Hague Trusts 
Convention choice of law rules for the common law. This has the merit of convenience. Despite the 
doubts as to whether resulting and constructive trusts fall within the scope of the Act, there is nothing to 
stop the common law from adopting the same position as under the Hague Trusts Convention. However, 
for the reasons stated above, this option is unsatisfactory and will not be explored any further here.  
The second approach is to treat trusts as concerning equitable obligations to be governed by the 
lex fori. The third option is to consider that trusts involve restitutionary obligations and hence apply the 
unjust enrichment choice of law rule.47 These two options will now be examined. 
 
1. Trusts as equitable obligations to be governed by the lex fori 
 
There is a significant body of case law where the principle has been developed that equitable rights are 
determined by the lex fori, even if those rights relate to property situated abroad.48 While the rule was laid 
down that an English court has no jurisdiction at common law to rule on questions of title to land 
abroad,49 the rationale for the English court’s jurisdiction over equitable rights over land located abroad 
                                                 
47 Some commentators argue that unjust enrichment includes proprietary restitution as well : Burrows, supra, fn 32; 
Millett, supra, fn 32. However, the application of the unjust enrichment choice of law rule to trusts claims is 
considered under the rubric of ‘obligations’ here because, as will be argued below, most of the authorities in favour 
of this approach apply the unjust enrichment choice of law rule in the context of a personal restitutionary obligation.  
48 Eg. Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 444, 27 E.R. 1132; National Commercial Bank v. Wimborne, 28 
April 1978 (unreported); Angus v. Angus (1737) West temp. Hardwicke 23; Lord Cranstown v. Johnston (1796) 3 
Ves. 170; Re Courtney ex parte Pollard (1840) Mont. & Ch. 239. 
49 British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique [1893] A.C. 601. 
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was that it was merely exercising its in personam jurisdiction over the defendant : ‘this Court cannot act 
upon the land directly but acts upon the conscience of the person living here …’.50  
Furthermore : 
 
‘The Equity Court has long taken the view that because it is a Court of conscience and acts 
in personam, it has jurisdiction over persons within and subject to its jurisdiction to require 
them to act in accordance with the principles of equity administered by the court wherever 
the subject matter and whether or not it is possible for the court to make orders in rem in the 
particular matter.’51 
 
Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind that this principle developed under the old system when 
Equity was solely administered by the Court of Chancery. White has convincingly demonstrated that the 
jurisdictional rules exercised by the Court of Chancery differ from the present rules.52 The body of case 
law standing as authority for the application of the lex fori to trusts was from a time when the Court of 
Chancery insisted on there being a substantial connection between the defendant and England before it 
deigned to exercise its jurisdiction over the defendant. After the reforms initiated by the Judicature Act 
1873, the principles adopted followed those of the common law courts where jurisdiction could be 
founded on the mere fleeting presence of the defendant within the forum.53 The requirement of a 
connection between the defendant and the forum for cases involving equity faded away. Hence, White 
argues that the earlier authorities have to be reconsidered.54   
Yet there is more modern authority with which to contend where the lex fori has been at the 
forefront in determining the existence of a trust. In Lightning v. Lightning Electrical Contractors Ltd,55 a 
resulting trust was claimed over property situated in Scotland. Under Scottish law the claim would have 
failed but it was held that English law was applicable to the claim as both parties were resident in England 
                                                 
50 Lord Cranstown v. Johnston (1796) 3 Ves. 170 at 182. 
51 Unreported, 28 April 1978, N.S.W.S.C. (EQ.), 1546/1978, quotation from Barnard, supra, fn. 41, at 488. 
52 “Equitable Obligations in Private International Law : The Choice of Law” (1986) 11 Sydney L.R. 92 at 104-106.  
53 Maharanee of Baroda v. Wildenstein [1972] 2 Q.B. 283. 
54 Supra, fn. 52, at 108.  
55 23 April 1998 (unreported). 
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and the only Scottish connection to the claim was the situs of the property. Gibson L.J. stated that : 
‘where a plaintiff invokes the in personam jurisdiction of the English court against a defendant amenable 
to the jurisdiction and there is an equity between the parties which the court can enforce, the English court 
will accept jurisdiction and apply English law as the applicable law, even though the suit relates to foreign 
land.’56 
From all this, one could come to two conclusions : first, the consistent insistence on the in 
personam jurisdiction exercised by the English court in trusts cases suggests that a trusts case is personal 
in nature; and secondly, that English law will be the governing law when equitable rights are at stake. As 
to the first point, the court may take jurisdiction on the basis of in personam jurisdiction, but that does not 
mean that the decree handed down lacks in rem effects. While the court may only formally be acting on 
the defendant’s conscience, a judgment declaring the existence of a trust in reality seeks to affect 
ownership of property. The court is saying that the defendant does not own the property outright, but 
holds only the legal title subject to the beneficial rights of the claimant in the property. The emphasis on 
the in personam basis of jurisdiction of the courts should not obscure the underlying proprietary aspect of 
trusts claims.57  
As to the point that English law is the governing law for equitable claims, one must be wary of 
over-reliance on the above cases for choice of law purposes. It has to be stressed that they were mainly 
concerned with the court’s jurisdiction over foreign land, rather than choice of law issues.58 Having 
ascertained that they had jurisdiction, the lex fori was then usually applied with little analysis.59 Secondly, 
                                                 
56 See also El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All E.R. 717 at 736e-737j; United States Surgical 
Corporation v. Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 766; A-G (UK) v. Heinemann 
Publishers Australian Pty Ltd (1987) 10 N.S.W.L.R. 86. 
57 The courts may have used in personam reasoning, but ‘[t]his piece of historical hoodwinkery can hardly be used 
in the modern world to pretend that equitable titles are not rights of property.’ : A. Briggs, “The Brussels 
Convention” (1994) 14 Y.E.L. 557 at 565-566. The courts are using an in personam reason to grant a proprietary 
interest. For a detailed exposition of the intrinsically proprietary nature of rights asserted under a trust, see infra, 
section IV.C.1. 
58 In Lightning v. Lightning, 23 April 1998 (unreported), it was recognised as such, but Gibson L.J. stated that ‘it 
seems to me implicit that the English court not unnaturally regarded English law as applicable to the relationship 
between the parties before it in the absence of any event governed by the lex situs destructive of the equitable 
interest being asserted.’ 
59 Barnard, supra, fn 41, at 490. 
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in some of the cases, English law was applied as the lex causae and not qua the lex fori.60 Thirdly, there is 
little reason to treat equitable claims differently from legal claims and assume that equitable claims will 
be governed by the lex fori. Indeed, it is now generally accepted that claims involving equitable rights and 
obligations are to be treated in a similar fashion to the nearest legal equivalent.61 As Bird puts it : ‘The 
historical accident of their development by the Courts of Chancery does not warrant their characterisation 
as equitable for choice of law purposes.’62 In accordance with the principle that like cases should be 
treated alike, equitable claims should be subject to the same choice of law process as for legal claims and 
not automatically consigned to the domain of the lex fori.63  
The rejection of the routine application of the lex fori in cases involving equitable rights and 
remedies64 has support in the case law. In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd,65 
New York law was applied to impose a constructive trust upon the defendant. In Macmillan Inc. v. 
Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3),66 the Court of Appeal applied New York law to test an assertion 
by the plaintiffs that shares transferred in breach of trust to the defendant were held on constructive 
trust.67 At first instance, Millett J. remarked that : ‘It is no answer to assert that a claim which invokes the 
intervention of equity is a claim in personam and part of the law of remedies, and – a highly dubious 
proposition – as such is governed by the lex fori.’68 
For all the above reasons, it is submitted that trusts should not be classified as being equitable 
obligations to be governed automatically by the lex fori. 
 
                                                 
60 White, supra, fn 52, at 107. E.g. British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd  [1910] 2 Ch. 502 
(overturned by the House of Lords, [1912] A.C. 52, on a different point). 
61 El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All E.R. 717 at 739j, per Millett J; Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. 
Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378 at 387B-C (P.C.); Thahir v. Pertamina [1994] 3 S.L.R. 257 at 270B.  
62 Supra, fn 28, p. 78.  
63 See Stevens, supra, fn 29, pp. 154-155; Panagopoulos, supra, fn 28, p. 58; T.M. Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable 
Doctrines (Oxford : Oxford University Press) (2004), paras. 2.19-2.30, pp. 61-66, para. 10.16, p. 337. 
64 The proposition that the lex fori should apply because trusts concern remedies has been criticised above; text to 
fns 38-46. 
65 [1981] Ch. 105. 
66 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 387 (hereafter “Macmillan”). 
67 See also Pettkus v. Becker (1981) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257. 
68 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 978 at 989. 
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2. Trusts as restitutionary obligations to be governed by the proper law of the unjust enrichment 
claim 
 
There is support for the proposition that the choice of law rule for unjust enrichment should be applied to 
claims involving the assertion of a constructive trust. However, it is doubtful that constructive trusts 
always arise in response to unjust enrichment.69 Nevertheless, legal systems which admit the remedial 
constructive trust as part of their law often recognise unjust enrichment as being the trigger for the 
imposition of a constructive trust. Under the domestic law of the United States and Canada, constructive 
trusts are viewed as a remedy imposed by the court to compel the defendant to surrender the enrichment.70 
One could attempt the same analysis for the institutional constructive trust : it arises at the moment the 
defendant’s conscience is affected to prevent his or her unjust enrichment.71 For example, in the context 
of a void contract, the constructive trust arises upon the defendant being aware that the property in his 
hands was transferred under the mistaken assumption that the contract is valid.72 However, this analysis is 
not the orthodox explanation for all English constructive trusts and indeed, as Barnard notes, the rationale 
that unjust enrichment forms the basis for imposing constructive trusts ‘does not accord with the majority 
view in the Commonwealth.’73 
Having said that, there are a number of advocates who support application of the choice of law 
rule for unjust enrichment to trusts claims. Amongst these advocates is Panagopoulos, who argues that : 
‘As it is the law of unjust enrichment which gives rise to the proprietary remedy, the issue in dispute is 
                                                 
69 Supra, text to fns 31-32.  
70 § 160 of the Restatement of  the Law of Restitution (U.S.); § 1 of the Restatement (Third) of  the Law of Trusts, 
comment e, p. 8; Barnard, supra, fn 41, at 478; Castel, supra, fn 43, p. 550 (Canada); Pettkus v. Becker (1981) 117 
D.L.R. (3d) 257; Sorochan v. Sorochan (1986) 29 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Rawluk v. Rawluk (1990) 65 D.L.R. (4th) 161; 
Peter v. Beblow (1993) 101 D.L.R. (4th) 621. 
71 Westdeutsche [1996] A.C. 669 at 715, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Virgo, supra, fn 32, p. 632. Cf. Millett, supra, 
fn 32; and Barnard, supra, fn 41, at 478, who suggests that Canadian courts would consider the institutional 
constructive trust (if such trusts survived the development of the remedial constructive trust) as being a remedy 
imposed to redress equitable wrongdoing and thus apply the choice of law rule for equitable wrongs. 
72 See Westdeutsche, ibid., at 715, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. Cf. C. Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context 
(Oxford : Hart Publishing) (2002). 
73 Barnard, supra, fn 41, at 480 (footnote 25).  
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really about the existence of a right to restitution.’74 Dicey and Morris also suggest that constructive trusts 
are best regarded as within the subject of restitution, although unfortunately they offer little explanation 
for this stance.75  
Most of the authorities in favour of applying the unjust enrichment choice of law rule to resulting 
and constructive trusts stem from Dicey and Morris’s Rule 200. This provides that : 
 
‘(1) The obligation to restore the benefit of an enrichment obtained at another person’s 
expense is governed by the proper law of the obligation. 
(2) The proper law of the obligation is (semble) determined as follows : 
(a) If the obligation arises in connection with a contract, its proper law is the law applicable 
to the contract; 
(b) If the obligation arises in connection with a transaction involving an immovable (land), 
its proper law is the law of the country where the immovable is situated (lex situs); 
(c) If it arises in any other circumstances, its proper law is the law of the country where the 
enrichment occurs.’ 
 
In relation to constructive trusts, it appears that Rule 200(2)(c) is applicable.76 However, most of 
the authorities cited as support for their contention are weak. The remarks by Millett J. in El Ajou v. 
Dollar Land Holdings77 in favour of the ‘place of enrichment’ rule were obiter, as no foreign law had 
been pleaded. Chase Manhattan,78 another case footnoted in Dicey and Morris, is also poor authority. 
While Rule 200(2)(c) was referred to in counsel’s arguments, it was not referred to in the judgment.79 
New York law was agreed by both parties to be the applicable law and the task before Goulding J. was 
merely to determine whether the equitable right of a claimant to trace or claim money paid under a 
mistake was substantive or procedural in nature. 
More recent cases which have also applied Rule 200(2)(c) are similarly weak authority for the 
proposition that the unjust enrichment choice of law rule should be applied to actions where the claimant 
                                                 
74 Supra, fn 28, pp. 66-67. 
75 Para. 29-026, p. 1096. See also Bird, supra, fn 28, pp. 82-83; Castel, supra, fn 43, p. 550. 
76 Dicey and Morris, pp. 1502-1504. 
77 [1993] 3 All E.R. 717 at 736g-j. 
78 [1981] Ch. 105. 
79 Panagopoulos, supra, fn 28, p. 120. 
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is contending that he or she holds a beneficial interest in property. Many of them are in reality concerned 
with personal liability based on fault; that is, constructive trusteeship, as opposed to a constructive trust. 
For example, in Trustor AB v. Smallbone,80 Smallbone was the managing director of Trustor, a Swedish 
company. A bank account for Trustor was established in England by Smallbone, without the authority of 
Trustor’s board of directors. Money was then misappropriated from this account to, amongst others, the 
English bank account of Introcom, a company incorporated in Gibraltar and controlled by Smallbone.  
Introcom later paid some of this money to Smallbone in England. Sir Richard Scott V-C held that Trustor 
was entitled to treat Introcom as a constructive trustee of the money it had received from the Trustor 
account. His Lordship referred to Dicey and Morris’s Rule 200(2)(c) and held that the proper law of the 
constructive trust was English law as the money was both paid and received in England. In addition, it 
was held that Smallbone in turn became constructive trustee of the Trustor money received via Introcom 
and that this aspect was again governed by English law.81  
Introcom’s liability was founded on knowing receipt. Although there was equivocation as to 
whether Smallbone’s liability was founded on knowing receipt or dishonest assistance,82 both these claims 
are clearly not based on the proprietary entitlement of the claimant. Dishonest assistance is seen as a form 
of equitable wrongdoing; the claim is for personal liability to make monetary compensation, and not the 
enforcement of a proprietary interest of the claimant.83 It has been argued that dishonest assistance could 
be interpreted as a form of restitution for wrongs.84 While there is a school of thought that restitutionary 
                                                 
80 9/5/2000 (unreported); hereafter “Trustor”). 
81 The Court of Appeal also considered that Smallbone’s liability was not confined to the amount that he had 
personally received. Since Introcom was essentially a creature of Smallbone and the payments made by 
Introcom of Trustor’s money were made with Smallbone’s knowing assistance, he was to be jointly and 
severally liable with Introcom for all the payments made by Introcom with Trustor’s money. This aspect of their 
judgment was applied in Trustor AB v. Smallbone (No. 2) [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1177. Furthermore, Trustor had an 
additional claim against Smallbone, as the managing director of Trustor, for damages or compensation for 
conspiracy and breach of duty. The Court of Appeal held that this was to be governed by Swedish law as 
Trustor is a Swedish company. 
82 See Trustor AB v. Smallbone (No. 2), ibid., at 1180-1186.  
83 Grupo Torras S.A. v. Al-Sabah [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank. 36, esp. [123] and [131].  
84 Virgo, supra, fn 32, pp. 554-555. 
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wrongs constitute a separate cause of action in unjust enrichment under English domestic law,85 recent 
judicial statements have refuted this line of thinking.86 This article is not concerned with the minefield of 
restitutionary wrongdoing. Suffice it to say that there is a respectable body of opinion that for private 
international law purposes, restitutionary wrongs should be classified as ‘wrongs’ and governed by their 
own choice of law rule.87 The causative event for wrongs is the wrong itself, and not unjust enrichment. In 
contrast, knowing receipt has been judicially accepted as the equitable counterpart of the common law 
unjust enrichment action for money had and received.88 While this would rationalise recourse to Rule 200 
for such claims, it is again not based on the proprietary entitlement of the claimant to the misappropriated 
trust money but is instead concerned with the personal fault-based liability of the defendant. This analysis 
is borne out by the judgment in Trustor. Scott V-C’s judgment stressed that : ‘The impropriety of the 
payments was known to the recipients.’ It was this knowledge of the impropriety which enabled Trustor 
to treat Introcom and Smallbone as ‘constructive trustees’. Thus, although it was held that a ‘constructive 
                                                 
85 J. Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford : Clarendon Press) (1991), pp. 25-28, 206-243; 
I.M. Jackman, “Restitution for Wrongs” (1989) 48 C.L.J. 302. See also Chesworth v. Farrar [1967] 1 Q.B. 407. 
86 Grupo Torras S.A. v. Al-Sabah [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank. 36 at [122] and [140]. However, note that while 
the Court of Appeal rejected an unjust enrichment analysis for dishonest assistance claims, they did not at the 
same time examine whether such claims were a form of restitution for wrongs. In Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan 
[1995] 2 A.C. 378 at 386, the Privy Council stated that : ‘Recipient liability is restitution-based; accessory 
liability is not.’ However, as Virgo argues, the word ‘restitution’ was probably used synonymously with ‘unjust 
enrichment’ and therefore does not preclude an interpretation of dishonest assistance claims within the 
restitutionary framework based on a separate cause of action predicated on a wrong and not unjust enrichment; 
supra, fn 32, p. 555. In relation to equitable wrongs in general, see Base Metal Trading Ltd v. Shamurin [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1316; [2005] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 17. The case concerned the breach of an equitable duty of care 
owed by a director of a company. Although Tomlinson J. at first instance ([2003] EWHC 2419 (Comm.); 
[2004] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 159, at [44]) had referred to a passage in the section in Dicey and Morris dealing 
with the application of Rule 200 to equitable wrongs cases (pp. 1499-1500, para. 34-032), the characterisation 
adopted by the judge is unclear. Arden L.J. in the Court of Appeal assumed that a contractual characterisation 
was adopted (at [73]) and the Court of Appeal did not consider Rule 200 at all. For a commentary on this case, 
see Yeo, “Choice of Law for Director’s Equitable Duty of Care and Concurrence” [2005] L.M.C.L.Q. 144.  
87 See Panagopoulos, supra, fn 28, pp. 81-94; Bird, supra, fn 28, p. 76; R. Stevens, “The Choice of Law Rules of 
Restitutionary Obligations” in F. Rose (ed.), Restitution and the Conflict of Laws (Oxford : Mansfield Press) (1995), 
pp. 187-191; Yeo, supra, fn 63, pp. 319-320. In Base Metal Trading Ltd v. Shamurin [2004] EWCA Civ 1316; 
[2005] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 17, the Court of Appeal applied different choice of law rules to the concurrent actions of 
tort and equitable wrongdoing that arose in that instant case. They applied the law of the place of incorporation of 
the company to the latter claim. Yeo, ibid., at 147, argues that the Court of Appeal characterised the claim within the 
category of ‘corporations’ and thus the case does not support a distinct category of ‘equitable wrongs’ for choice of 
law purposes. However, the Court of Appeal’s approach would not be inconsistent with the existence of a category 
of ‘equitable wrongs’ under which the particular wrong of breach of the equitable duty of care by a company 
director would be governed by the law of the place of incorporation of the company. 
88 El Ajou  v. Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All E.R. 717 at 736g-h, per Millett J. See also Royal Brunei 
Airlines v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378 at 386; Grupo Torras S.A. v. Al-Sabah [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank. 36 at [122]. 
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trust’ came into existence upon Introcom’s receipt of the money from Trustor, the ‘constructive trust’ that 
was imposed here was not based on the notion of Trustor having a proprietary interest in the moneys, but 
on the wrongdoing on Smallbone and Introcom’s part.89 It is therefore not good authority for the 
proposition that assertions that property is subject to a resulting or constructive trust are to be governed by 
the unjust enrichment choice of law rule.  
Other cases which also have applied Dicey and Morris’s Rule 200 are similarly more to do with 
wrongdoing rather than being trusts claims.90 Another such case is Kuwait Oil Tanker Co. SAK v. Al 
Bader (No. 3).91 In Kuwait, the defendants conspired to steal money from the claimant company. The case 
was mainly concerned with the tort of conspiracy but it was also alleged that the defendants were liable as 
constructive trustees to make restitution to the claimant. It should be noted that the defendants were 
members of the senior management of the claimant company and hence owed fiduciary duties to the 
claimant in respect of the funds under their control. The Court of Appeal adopted a four stage approach : 
(1) what was the proper law of the relationship between the parties; (2) what were the duties imposed by 
that law; (3) were such duties to be regarded as fiduciary in nature according to English law; and (4) if so, 
was it unconscionable for the defendant to retain the disputed assets?92 Rule 200(2)(c) was then 
inexplicably93 applied to determine the proper law of the relationship, and was judged to point towards 
Kuwaiti law. It is not entirely clear why the unjust enrichment choice of law rule would point towards the 
proper law of the relationship. In addition, while Nourse L.J. rejected the label of ‘constructive trustees’ 
                                                 
89 Cf. Yeo, supra, fn 63, para. 9.13, p. 313, who adopts a more proprietary interpretation of the case. 
90 Thahir v. Pertamina [1994] 3 S.L.R. 257; Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 543, [1996] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 589 (C.A.). See J. Bird, “Bribes, Restitution and the Conflict of Laws” [1995] L.M.C.L.Q. 198; 
Panagopoulos, supra, fn 28, pp. 84-86. 
91 17 December 1998 (Moore-Bick J., unreported); [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 271 (C.A.); hereafter “Kuwait”. For 
commentaries on the case, see A. Briggs, “Decisions of the British Courts During 2000 : Private International Law” 
(2000) 71 B.Y.B.I.L. 435, at 471-472; G. Virgo, “Interest, Constructive Trusts and the Conflict of Laws” [2000] 
R.L.R. 122.  
92 [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 271 at [192], approving Chadwick J.’s judgment in Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim 
(15 June 1994, unreported). 
93 See Briggs, supra, fn 91, at 471-472. 
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for the defendants that was used by Moore-Bick J. at first instance,94 his Lordship opined that they should 
be treated as if they were actual trustees of the funds, by virtue of the fact that they controlled the 
company’s funds and owed fiduciary duties to the company.95 Notwithstanding the different terminology, 
this suggests that the basis of the defendants’ liabilities was really founded on their committing breaches 
of fiduciary duty. That being so, this aspect of the claim should have been more naturally associated with 
equitable wrongdoing rather than unjust enrichment. The basis of this judgment, insofar as unjust 
enrichment is concerned, is highly unsatisfactory. 
It is submitted that the above cases are not good authority for the proposition that the unjust 
enrichment choice of law rule should be applied to claims involving the assertion of a constructive trust. It 
is clear that these cases were not so much founded on the claimant’s beneficial interest in the property, 
but rather the personal liability of the defendants. In other words, they were concerned with ‘constructive 
trusteeship’ and not ‘constructive trusts’. The type of claim under scrutiny in this article is the latter, not 
the former.96 
This might lead the reader to wonder why so much ink was spilled on these allegedly irrelevant 
cases. The answer is that analysis of the cases was necessary to dispel the notion that there is good 
authority for applying the unjust enrichment choice of law rule to claims which are truly based on the 
assertion of the claimant’s beneficial proprietary interest. The analysis was also necessary to illustrate that 
the cases were not necessarily to be interpreted within an unjust enrichment framework.97 Even if one 
disagrees with this view, the fact that there is a healthy debate on this issue is evidence that focussing on 
                                                 
94 Although, ‘constructive trustee’ here was used more to denote the defendants’ equitable liability for the purposes 
of awarding compound interest, rather than whether the defendants held identifiable property on an institutional 
constructive trust. See Virgo, supra, fn 91.  
95 [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 271 at [187]-[189]. His Lordship would limit the phrase ‘constructive trustees’ to 
persons who do not owe the principal any fiduciary duties. This restriction of the label of ‘constructive trustee’ to 
such persons appears to be a novel development; in Guinness plc v. Saunders [1990] 2 A.C. 663, the House of Lords 
held that a director of Guinness, and who therefore owed the company fiduciary duties, was liable to account for an 
unauthorised payment he had received as a ‘constructive trustee’ for Guinness.  
96 Even in relation to constructive trusteeship claims, the applicability of Rule 200(2)(c) is debatable : in Luiz 
Vicente Barros Mattos Jr v. MacDaniels Ltd [2005] EWHC 1323, Collins J. analysed the relevant cases and 
concluded that ‘There is no decision of the Court of Appeal in which approval of Rule 200(2)(c), or the 
application of a similar principle, is the ratio’ (para. 117). 
97 See also Chambers, supra, fn 23; Chambers, “Constructive Trusts in Canada (Pt 2)” (2002) 16 Trust Law 
International 2.   
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the correct characterisation of the cause of action would not necessarily lead to the most suitable choice of 
law solution for trusts claims. Nevertheless, all this does not detract from the recognition that a 
constructive trust could be said to arise in response to the defendant’s unjust enrichment in some 
circumstances. It does, however, suggest that the unjust enrichment choice of law rule should not be 
applied.98  
The above discussion has been focussed on constructive trusts. Some have argued that resulting 
trusts also arise in response to unjust enrichment.99 As a presumed resulting trust arises on the legal 
presumption that the claimant intended to retain the beneficial interest, there could be a case for 
contending that the ‘intention’ of the claimant would extend to having the law governing the relationship 
between the parties also govern the trust. Arguably, Dicey and Morris’s Rule 200(2)(a), which points 
towards the governing law of the contract, should be implemented with respect to resulting trust claims 
arising from a failed contract.100 In fact, in Lightning v. Lightning Electrical Contractors Ltd,101 the Court 
of Appeal put emphasis on the law governing the relationship between the parties. Although the Court of 
Appeal did not adopt an unjust enrichment analysis, this decision suggests that perhaps Rule 200(2)(a) is 
applicable when a resulting trust is alleged to arise in the aftermath of a failed contract. However, it is 
submitted that any emphasis on unjust enrichment here, as for constructive trusts, would be misplaced. It 
will be argued below that this stress on unjust enrichment reasoning belies the essential proprietary nature 
of trusts.102  
  
B. Trusts as a hybrid of obligation and property law: the flexible mid-way approach 
 
                                                 
98 Cf. Bird, supra, fn 28, pp. 82-83. 
99 Chambers, supra, fn 23, 228; Stevens, supra, fn 29, p. 153. 
100 R.P. Meagher and W.M.C. Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (Sydney : Butterworths) (5th edn, 
1986), support application of the proper law of the relationship between the parties with respect to constructive 
trusts of movables arising from contractual or fiduciary relations between the parties. By this, the authors mean 
either the law chosen to govern the relationship or, in the absence of choice, the law of closest connection : para. 
2804, p. 712. 
101 23 April 1998 (unreported). Facts above, text to fn 55.  
102 Infra, section IV.C.1. 
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The two conflicting positions that could be taken towards trusts are either to regard them as forming part 
of the law of obligations, or part of the law of property. A flexible mid-way approach, which attempts to 
take into account the dual nature of trusts, could hold the answer towards reconciling these two 
contradictory positions.   
One obvious model for this approach would be to take the cue from Article 7 of the Hague Trusts 
Convention. As will be recalled, Article 7 provides that where no law has been chosen to govern the trust, 
it shall be governed by the law to which it is most closely connected. Factors that should particularly be 
taken into account are listed as being the place of administration of the trust, the situs of the trust assets, 
the place of residence or business of the trustee and the objects of the trust and places where they are to be 
fulfilled. As far as constructive and resulting trusts are concerned, the place of administration of the trust 
and the place of residence or business of the trustee are not particularly significant factors as the trustee 
has no active administrative or fiduciary duties; his obligation would be merely to convey the property 
when requested to do so. However, the situs of the trust assets should hold particular sway when the 
assets concerned are immovables. In addition, the governing law of the relationship between the parties 
may be an important consideration. If the unjust enrichment analysis of constructive and resulting trusts is 
accepted, the place of enrichment could also be of importance. This is because the heart of an unjust 
enrichment claim is considered to be the defendant’s enrichment and therefore place where he or she is 
enriched is an important connecting factor.103 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that this law of closest connection approach should be rejected. The 
uncertainty of any approach that adopts a law of closest connection approach is self-evident. Albeit that 
Article 7 is clearer than the old common law test of closest connection for express trusts, in that it at least 
sets out a list of relevant factors that should be considered by the court, it is suggested that the inevitable 
uncertainties of a process dependent on weighing diverse factors make this an undesirable rule to adopt 
                                                 
103 E.g. Dicey and Morris’s Rule 200(2)(c); Article 9(3) of the proposed Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations (hereafter the “proposed Rome II Regulation”), COM (2003) 427. 
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with respect to trusts arising under the common law. If a better option exists, as will be argued below that 
it does, giving the court leeway to weigh factors up against each other is best avoided.  
 
C. Trusts as property 
 
It is suggested that the approach that should be adopted towards constructive and resulting trusts is to 
regard them as falling within the law of property. The property choice of law rules should be applied to 
claims involving the assertion of a trust. It will be argued below that such application is founded on 
persuasive legal reasoning, has many advantages, and represents the best choice of law option. 
 
1. The underlying proprietary nature of trusts claims 
 
It is submitted that trusts claims are proprietary in nature. There are, of course, those who disagree with 
this view. It has been seen above that the Hague Trusts Convention appears to consider trusts as part of 
the law of obligations; in other words, rights asserted under a trust seem to be personal in nature.104 
However, the circumstances under which the Convention came to fruition must be borne in mind. The 
Hague choice of law rules were formulated with a view to acclimatising non-trust states to the trust 
concept, and in some systems with no concept of equitable ownership, the rights of a beneficiary were 
thought to be more akin to the law of obligations.105 Moreover, offshore states keen to attract investors 
wanted to preserve settlor autonomy and were not comfortable with the more onerous obligations that 
would have been imposed on them if trusts were subject to the property choice of law rules.106 It is 
submitted that a position adopted in negotiation with non-trust and offshore states is not recommended for 
extension into the common law, which has long known the trust institution. In addition, it should be 
                                                 
104 Although the preservation of mandatory property rules in some areas under Article 15 could be taken as support 
for a limited proprietary view of the Convention. 
105 Paton and Grasso, supra, fn 9, at 656; A. Dyer and H. van Loon, Report of Trusts and Analogous Institutions 
(The Hague : Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference) (1982), paras. 147-154, pp. 158-170. 
106 See in general, Harris, supra, fn 9, pp. 65-77. 
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recalled that the Hague Trusts Convention is primarily focused on express trusts, where the concept of 
‘settlor’ autonomy, which denotes the obligation characteristic of the trust, can more naturally be 
accepted.  
Gretton argues that rights claimed under a trust are not proprietary, or ‘real’, rights, but only 
personal rights.107 He proffers several reasons, amongst which are that : if the beneficiary’s right under a 
trust is real, it should not be trumped by a bona fide purchaser without notice; the general principle is that 
beneficial rights, unlike real rights in land, need not be, or cannot be, registered; it is the trustee, acting as 
the owner of trust assets, who will take action against a third party to the trust.108 In response, it could be 
retorted that, under English law at least,109 beneficial rights are unaffected by the insolvency of the 
trustee,110 and equitable interests may be stolen,111 sold or inherited.112 The mere fact that the rights of a 
beneficiary under a trust are not identical to legal rights in property is not a good reason of itself to 
discount the argument that beneficial rights can be proprietary in nature. 
One of the most fundamental points on Gretton’s list is the fact that beneficial rights can be 
defeated. If rights asserted under a trust are rights in rem, or, in other words, rights that are good against 
the whole world, surely the fact that they would be defeated by a bona fide purchaser without notice gives 
lie to this proposition? However, one must remember that even legal title too is never unreservedly ‘good 
against the whole world’. ‘Real’ rights, such as title to money and other forms of property, can also be 
lost or defeated in a number of situations113 : for example, a seller who holds a voidable title passes on a 
good title to a bona fide purchaser;114 as does a seller in possession of the goods after sale115 or a buyer in 
                                                 
107 “Trusts Without Equity” (2000) 49 I.C.L.Q. 599 at 605-607. 
108 Although if the trustee wrongfully transfers trust property to a third party, it would be the beneficiary who would 
sue the third party.  
109 Reference will be made to English law first to counter Gretton’s points before drawing on foreign trusts and 
analogous institutions.  
110 Re Kayford Ltd (1975) 1 W.L.R. 279. Although Gretton thinks that since trusts such as charitable purpose trusts, 
where equitable ownership is not attributed to the beneficiaries, are also protected from the trustee’s creditors, this 
factor is not a good indication of the ‘real’ nature of beneficial rights : supra, fn 107, at 606-607. 
111 Section 5(1) of the Theft Act 1968. 
112 Stevens, supra, fn 29, p. 148. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
115 Section 24, ibid. 
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possession of the goods after sale.116 As Briggs points out, ‘[a]bsolute indefeasibility cannot be the mark 
of ownership.’117 
Moreover, if the trustee wrongfully transfers trust property to a third party with notice of the trust, 
it would be the beneficiary who would have a claim against the third party as constructive trustee. This 
surely indicates that the beneficiary’s right is proprietary : ‘it strains credibility to maintain that the sum 
total of the claimant’s rights to sue does not add up to a right of property’.118 In addition, one who accepts 
that an assertion of a trust involves an obligation and thus is personal in nature must be forced to concede 
that the obligation would not exist without the concurrent imposition of beneficial ownership upon the 
claimant. As Stevens points out : ‘If the plaintiff at no time has a proprietary interest under a resulting 
trust, no personal obligations will be owed to him under a resulting trust as no resulting trust ever 
existed.’119 The reality is that claimants who assert the existence of a trust are typically after the ‘thing’ 
itself, not any personal obligations that may be owed to them under the trust.120 In connection with this, 
one should note that the principle laid down in Saunders v. Vautier121 enables beneficiaries, if they are 
ascertained and of full capacity, to terminate the trust and demand conveyance of the trust property to 
themselves as absolute owners. This is a powerful indication that under English law, the rights of the 
beneficiaries are ultimately proprietary in nature.  
The above is a very Anglo-centric view of the trust but it is equally valid when the trust is 
governed by a law of a country which adopts the common law conception of the trust.122 It is of course 
resulting and constructive trusts governed by a foreign law which are particularly relevant here since, as 
argued above, such trusts may not fall within the scope of the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 and are 
therefore governed by the common law choice of law rules. However, some jurisdictions, particularly 
                                                 
116 Section 25, ibid. 
117 Supra, fn 57, at 565. Cf. Webb v. Webb (Case No. C-294/92) [1994] I ECR 1717, para. 15; [1994] Q.B. 696. 
118 Briggs, ibid. Cf. Gretton, supra, fn 107, at 602. 
119 Supra, fn 29, p. 156. 
120 As Yeo notes, ‘Trusts arising by operation of law generally do not serve management functions; they are 
intended to compel the trustee to convey the property to the beneficiary’ :  supra, fn 63, para. 6.28, p. 188. 
121 (1841) 4 Beav. 115. 
122 Such as Australia and Canada. 
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civil law jurisdictions, do not accept the concept of duality of ownership which underpins the common 
law trust : the beneficiary is regarded as merely having a personal claim while ownership of trust property 
is wholly in the trustee’s hands. Yet despite this fundamental conceptual difference, shades of the 
proprietary principles underpinning common law trusts law can also be found in civil law jurisdictions. 
For example, the concept of a segregated trust fund is well-established in Scotland, South Africa, India, 
Japan and Sri Lanka.123 Under German law, the ‘beneficiaries’’ interests are protected from the creditors 
of the ‘trustee’.124 A similar situation exists under French law which has developed the concept of ‘double 
patrimony’ to that end.125 Venezuelan trust legislation provides that ‘trust’ property constitutes a separate 
patrimony unavailable to the ‘trustee’s’ creditors and that the ‘beneficiary’ has the right to set aside 
unlawful transfers by the ‘trustee’. It has been argued that these factors show that the ‘beneficiaries’’ 
rights under Venezuelan law are rights in rem.126 Furthermore, even though the Hague Trusts Convention 
appears to treat trusts as obligations, it should be noted that one of the defining characteristics of an 
international ‘trust’ set out under Article 2 is that ‘the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part 
of the trustee’s own estate’. This illustrates that the concept of a segregated fund, an important indicium 
of the property principles underlying the trust concept, is a cornerstone of the private international 
concept of a ‘trust’. 
The Scottish trust may be thought to be a paradigm example of a trust with an overwhelmingly 
personal character. Under Scottish law, the trustee is the owner of the property held on trust and the 
beneficiary merely has a personal right against the trustee.127 However, the beneficiary can recover trust 
property from a third party who is not a bona fide purchaser for value128 and the trust property is protected 
                                                 
123 D. Hayton, “Principles of European Trust Law” in D. Hayton (ed.), Modern International Developments in Trust 
Law (London : Kluwer) (1999), p. 23. 
124 E.D. Graue, “Trust-Like Devices under German Law” in W.A. Wilson (ed.), Trusts and Trust-Like Devices 
(United Kingdom Comparative Law Series, Vol. 5) (London : The Chameleon Press Ltd) (1981), p. 65; D. Hayton, 
supra, fn 123, p. 23. 
125 D.B. Walters, “Analogues of the Trust and of its Constituents in French Law, Approached from the Standpoint of 
Scots and English Law” in W.A. Wilson (ed.), ibid., p. 130. 
126 Dyer and van Loon, supra, fn 105, para. 42, p. 52. 
127 F.H. Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law (1953), p. 201, cited by Gretton, supra, fn 107, at 599; 
Walters, supra, fn 125, p. 120. 
128 W.A. Wilson, “The Trust in Scots Law” in W.A. Wilson (ed.), supra, fn 124, pp. 238, 241. 
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from the trustee’s creditors.129 Moreover, Scottish law has the equivalent of the Saunders v. Vautier130 
rule. In Earl of Lindsay v. Shaw, it was recognised that if all possible beneficiaries are of full age and sui 
juris, the ‘Court will not interfere to prevent the sole and unlimited proprietors from doing what they like 
with their own.’131 The phrasing itself strongly suggests that the court was of the opinion that the 
beneficiaries’ rights were proprietary in nature. All this points towards the conclusion that the right of a 
beneficiary under a trust governed by Scottish law, ostensibly a mere personal right, has a distinctly 
proprietary character.132  
It is suggested that there is a good basis for arguing that one should still regard an interest arising 
under a resulting or constructive trust as being proprietary even if the law under which the trust arises 
does not recognise the concept of beneficial ownership over trust property. Although the façade of mere 
personal beneficial rights may lead one instinctively to categorise trust claims as not belonging in the law 
of property, civilian conceptions of the trust more often than not hide an underlying proprietary core. 
Concepts such as a segregated trust fund and the protection of trust property from the trustee’s creditors 
are not consistent with a purely personal model of beneficial rights, nor is the entitlement of a beneficiary 
to demand conveyance into his own name. The so-called personal right is in most cases so tied up with 
the property itself that the right has in rem effects. It is submitted that the interest is in truth a proprietary 
one. 
To summarise, it is argued that a beneficiary’s right under an English conception of a trust is 
proprietary in nature. It is also argued that a beneficiary’s right under a civilian trust would in most cases 
be better described as proprietary as well since for almost all ‘trusts’ the ‘trust’ property is separate from 
the ‘trustee’s’ own property and is not available to the ‘trustee’s’ creditors.133 Having shown that all 
                                                 
129 Dyer and van Loon, supra, fn 105, para. 35, p. 44.  
130 (1841) 4 Beav. 115. 
131 1959 S.L.T. (Notes) 13 (emphasis added). 
132 Of course, now trusts governed by Scottish law would fall under the first limb of section 1(2) of the Recognition 
of Trusts Act 1987. 
133 If institutions where this is not the case exist, arguably they would not fall under the category of ‘trusts’ in private 
international law and would be subject to a different choice of law rule. 
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‘trusts’ have a fundamentally proprietary characteristic, it will now be considered whether it is best to 
apply the property choice of law rules to trusts claims. 
 
2. The case for the application of the property choice of law rules 
 
Giving prime emphasis to the proprietary nature of trusts makes sense in the private international law 
arena. When it is asserted that property is held on a resulting or constructive trust for the claimant, the 
establishment of a trust will frequently be a precursor to the claimant ending the trust and compelling the 
defendant to transfer the property absolutely back into his name.134 Therefore, the general justifications 
for the application of the property choice of law rules when outright transfers of property are at issue 
apply equally when it is a trusts claim.135  
What exactly are these justifications? In general, the property choice of law rules point towards 
the lex situs.136 The lex situs rule has been justified on several grounds. First, it protects party expectations 
in that reasonable men will expect that a transaction which transfers title of goods to the transferee 
according to the law of the country in which the property is situated will be conclusive.137 Bird, however, 
argues that it is more likely that where a deliberate and consensual relationship exists between the parties, 
their expectations would be for the law governing the transaction or relationship, rather than the lex situs, 
to govern unjust enrichment claims between them.138 This argument was also advanced in Glencore 
                                                 
134 Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 4 Beav. 115. 
135 Panagopoulos argues that the property choice of law rules were developed to resolve issues arising out of 
voluntary transfers of property and competing titles and are therefore wholly inappropriate in the case of proprietary 
restitution : supra, fn 28, p. 67. With respect, there does not appear to be much basis for this assertion. If the 
underlying heart of the issue is whether someone has absolute title over property, this is still a proprietary question 
even if it is labelled as a claim for proprietary restitution. 
136 One exception is the choice of law rule for debts. According to Raiffeisen Zentralbank v. Five Star Trading LLC 
[2001] EWCA Civ 68; [2001] Q.B. 825; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1344, the assignment of debts is to be treated as a 
contractual question to be governed by the applicable law of the contract of assignment (application of Article 12 of 
the Rome Convention).    
137 Macmillan [1996] 1 W.L.R. 387 at 400. 
138 Supra, fn 28, p. 118. See also S. Cohen, “Quasi-Contract and the Conflict of Laws” (1956) 31 Los Angeles Bar 
Bulletin  71 at 75. 
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International A.G. v. Metro Trading International Inc.(No. 2).139 The case was one part of a complex web 
of litigation which arose when the defendant MTI who were engaged in the storage, buying, blending and 
selling of fuel oil in Fujairah became insolvent. Various claimants asserted proprietary claims over the oil 
held by MTI. An argument put forward by the counsel for Glencore was that, where property is disposed 
of by contract, the parties’ natural expectation is that property will pass in accordance with the contract so 
long as there are no third party interests.140 This pointed towards English law, which was the proper law 
of the contract between Glencore and MTI. This contention was rejected by Moore-Bick J. who 
recognised the inconsistency that would have followed from this line of reasoning; that is, that the lex 
situs would decide where title lies when third party rights have intervened, and the law governing the 
contract where it has not.141 Moore-Bick J. instead endorsed the traditional orthodoxy of having the lex 
situs govern questions of title.142 It is suggested that his Lordship is correct. Determination of title does 
not fall within the ambit of the governing law of the contract or putative governing law of a void contract. 
First, it is well-established that there is a distinction between the contractual and proprietary effects of a 
transfer.143 The former, such as whether the seller is in breach of supplying goods of satisfactory quality, 
falls within the remit of the governing law of the contract.144 The latter, which concerns whether title 
passes to the buyer, is a matter solely for the lex situs. The governing law of the contract becomes 
relevant only if the lex situs takes into account the governing law of the contract in determining the 
proprietary effects of the transaction.145 Secondly, even if it could be said that the parties’ expectations 
                                                 
139 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 284 (hereafter “Glencore”). 
140 See also M. Bridge, who endorses a more dominant role for the governing law of the contract at least when it is a 
two-party case : “English Conflicts Rules for Transfers of Movables : A Contract-based Approach?” in M. Bridge 
and R. Stevens (eds), Cross Border Security and Insolvency (Oxford : Oxford University Press) (2001), pp. 123-143. 
141 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 284 at 294-295. 
142 On the basis that, inter alia, application of the lex situs would best reflect the natural expectations of reasonable 
men, the realities of control of movables, and the practical considerations of trade and commerce : ibid., at 294-296. 
143 Glencore [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 284, at [27]; Dicey and Morris, para. 24-005 (p. 965), para. 33-109 (pp. 1333-
1334); P.M. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (London : Butterworths) (13th 
edn, 1999), p. 942.   
144 Although admittedly some other contractual rights, such as the rights of stoppage in transit, have a quasi-
proprietary character too.   
145 Zahnrad Fabrik Pssau GmbH v. Terex Ltd  1986 S.L.T. 84; Glencore [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 284 at [23]-[24]; 
Dicey and Morris, para. 33-111, p. 1335. However, Dicey and Morris also posit an exception to the general rule 
(Rule 116, para. 24R-001, p. 963) that the lex situs at the time of transfer governs the validity of transfer of a 
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were to have the governing law of the contract, or putative governing law of the contract, as the case may 
be, govern the passing of property, this is one area of the law where party autonomy takes a back seat, in 
part because of the possibility of the intervention of third party rights in proprietary claims. 
 The practical realities of commercial transactions also furnishes a strong justification for the lex 
situs rule. As has been observed, ‘Any other rule would require extensive and probably fruitless enquiries 
into the provenance of the goods and expose the transferee to great uncertainty.’146 Although this may 
more readily be accepted in relation to immovables, it applies with equal force to movables. Commercial 
convenience necessarily dictates that questions of title to movables should also be decided in accordance 
with the lex situs.147 It would not be reasonable to expect a transferee further to investigate past title to 
ensure that no one else could claim title to the movables under another system of law. Indeed, it has been 
pointed out that adding this onus of further investigation on the transferee in many cases would not bring 
about certainty that his or her title is secure.148 This is especially so if the transferee is ignorant as to 
which foreign laws he would need to investigate. As Staughton L.J. observed in Macmillan Inc. v. 
Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) :  
 
‘A purchaser ought to satisfy himself that he obtains a good title by the law prevailing 
where the chattel is, for example in Petticoat Lane, but should not be required to do more 
than that. And an owner, if he does not wish to be deprived of his property by some 
eccentric rule of foreign law, can at least do his best to ensure that it does not leave the 
safety of his own country.’149 
 
Another oft-cited justification for the lex situs rule is that it is the lex situs which has effective 
power over the asset concerned. Allied to this is the fact that the claimant is likely to have to turn to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
tangible movable. They state : ‘If a tangible movable is in transit, and its situs is casual or not known, a transfer 
which is valid and effective by its applicable law will semble be valid and effective in England’ (para. 24E-015, p. 
968). This exception is envisaged to be very limited in scope; it is intended to apply only when the situs is 
indeterminate and unknown to the parties. From the illustrations it appears that the applicable law of the transfer is 
synonymous with the applicable law of the contract of transfer.  
146 Glencore [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 284 at [28], per Moore-Bick J. See also Re Anziani [1930] 1 Ch. 407 at 420.   
147 Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd [1980] Ch. 496 at 512, per Slade J. 
148 Ibid., at 513, per Slade J. 
149 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 387 at 400. 
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courts where the asset is situated in order to enforce his rights.150 Again, this is axiomatic with respect to 
immovables; however, this justification also extends to movables. Moore-Bick J. explained it thus : 
‘Practical control over movables can ultimately only be regulated and protected by the state in which they 
are situated and the adoption of the lex situs rule in relation to the passing of property is in part a 
recognition of that fact.’151 Admittedly, this rationale is weak if the asset has been moved around such that 
the situs at the time of the relevant transaction no longer coincides with its present situs. Such was the 
situation in Winkworth v. Christie, Manson and Woods Ltd152 where works of art stolen from England 
were sold to the second defendant in Italy and thereafter brought back to England to be auctioned by the 
first defendants. Under Italian law, the lex situs at the time of transfer, the second defendant acquired 
good title. Slade J. upheld the title gained under Italian law to preserve security of title and commercial 
convenience. This illustrates that although the justification of control is not relevant when the asset has 
been taken to another jurisdiction after the transfer, the other reasons for the lex situs rule still remain. 
The above justifications for the application of the lex situs when legal title is at issue are result-
oriented and expectation-based; most fundamentally, the same justifications are also true for the transfer 
of an equitable interest. Therefore, it is submitted that the best approach is to apply the property choice of 
law rules to a claim involving the assertion of a resulting or constructive trust. It is the proprietary 
characteristic of trusts claims that should be elevated and characterised for choice of law purposes. It has 
been argued that this choice of law approach can be defended on grounds of principle and pragmatism.153  
  
3. Authority for the application of the property choice of law rules 
 
                                                 
150 Ibid., at 424. 
151 Glencore [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 284 at [31]. 
152 [1980] Ch. 496. 
153 As for the bootstraps problem as to which law applies to the trust, it is suggested that if the alleged trust 
concerns property located in Ruritania, first, the lex fori must be satisfied that there is a good arguable case of a 
valid trust governed by Ruritanian law, Ruritanian law being the law identified by the property choice of law 
rules; before Ruritanian law, as the putative governing law of the trust, is applied to determine whether there is 
in fact a valid trust governed by Ruritanian law. See Harris, supra, fn 9, pp. 276-278. 
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There is some authority for the application of the lex situs for immovables. § 235 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that : ‘The existence and extent of an equitable interest in land are 
determined by the law that would be applied by the courts of the situs’ and then goes on to observe that 
the courts ‘would usually apply their own local law in determining such questions.’154 In McGean v. 
McGean,155 the question before the court was whether a wife had a beneficial interest in the family home 
which was in the name of the husband solely. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia applied 
Maryland law to determine whether a house located in Maryland was impressed with a resulting trust.156 
According to Meagher and Gummow, resulting and constructive trusts of immovables are also governed 
by the lex situs in Australia.157  
There is admittedly little authority in favour of the choice of law approach that is advocated here. 
However, as has been shown above, the other choice of law options available similarly suffer from a lack 
of solid authority. As such, this lack of authority should not be allowed to obscure the fact that application 
of the property choice of law rules remains the best option.  
 
4. Criticisms of application of the property choice of law rules to trusts claims 
 
(a) Against conflicts orthodoxy 
 
As has been noted earlier, for choice of law purposes, conflict of laws principles dictate that it is the cause 
of action, or issue at stake, that is characterised. Yet the method advocated here involves characterising 
the response to the causative event, and not the event itself. However, as Harris asserts : ‘It is appropriate 
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50/1991.  
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to recognise that sometimes it is not the nature of the cause of action but the interest that is ultimately 
being asserted that is of greater importance.’158 This is surely true when the interest involved is a 
proprietary one, as property rights are obviously one of the most stalwart type of rights that could be 
asserted. In addition, it is still unclear how the event which triggers the imposition of a constructive or 
resulting trust should be characterised, so a choice of law rule based on the indeterminate cause of action 
would hardly make for clear law. It is submitted that the divergence from usual conflict of law principles 
and characterising the consequences of an event instead of the event itself in order to determine the most 
appropriate choice of law rule is not only justifiable, but necessary in this instance, if one is to achieve a 
measure of certainty in this area of the law. Focusing on the end result would alleviate the problem of 
characterisation. 
In addition, one should be careful not to exaggerate the unorthodoxy of the recommended 
approach. The justifications given for the application of the lex situs in property law are very result-
oriented; practicality is the main feature. Reasons of enforceability and protecting party expectations 
apply equally to a claim concerning an outright transfer of legal title and to a trusts claim.  
 
(b) Two different laws determine whether a personal or proprietary claim exists 
 
Let us say that A transfers land to B pursuant to a void contract that is governed by the law of Ruritania. 
The land is located in Utopia. A has three options : (i) A could pursue an unjust enrichment claim 
whereby B is personally liable to account for the value of the property transferred; (ii) A could argue that 
B holds the property on trust for him; or (iii) A could demand the property back on the basis that legal 
title never left his hands, or if it did, that legal title should revest in him. The first option would involve 
application of the unjust enrichment choice of law rule. Application of Dicey and Morris’s Rule 200(2)(a) 
would point towards the putative governing law of the contract, that is, Ruritanian law. The last two 
                                                 
158 “The Trust in Private International Law” in J.J. Fawcett (ed.), Reform and Development of Private International 
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options involve property issues, and should be governed by the property choice of law rules.159 Since the 
disputed property is land, this points towards application of the lex situs, that is, Utopian law. 
There are two problems. First, in relation to the same causative event, one law determines 
whether a personal claim exists, and another law determines whether a proprietary claim exists. Secondly, 
it could be that Ruritanian law allows a personal or a proprietary claim, but Utopian law only allows a 
personal claim. If B is bankrupt, a different result would ensue depending on whether Ruritanian or 
Utopian law is applied. A would have no practical remedy under Utopian law.160  
It is conceded that these are downsides if trusts claims are governed by property choice of law 
rules. However, it is submitted that the alternative options, that is, treating trusts as part of the law of 
obligations, and treating trusts as a hybrid of the law of property and the law of obligations, would lead to 
much less satisfactory results. These two alternative choice of law routes have already been examined in 
detail above and it has been shown that they are ill-suited for application to trusts claims and are not 
jurisprudentially sound. In contrast, application of the property choice of law rules to trusts claims 
recognises the fundamental proprietary nature of such claims, offers many advantages and is backed by 
some authority. This option is not flawless, but it will rarely be the case that a choice of law rule is able to 
cater for every eventuality that may arise. In the vast majority of cases, the application of the property 
choice of law rules would lead to the most satisfying result in that the decision reached will reflect the 
essential proprietary nature of trusts. 
  
(c) Assets located in more than one jurisdiction 
 
Millett L.J. has rejected the application of the lex situs rule in the context of a presumed resulting trust 
where A provided money to B to buy land in his name.161 His Lordship argued that application of the lex 
                                                 
159 Option (iii) is not within the scope of this paper; however, the arguments set out here in favour of treating trusts 
claims as part of the law of property obviously apply a fortiori for claims for legal title.  
160 A would only be an unsecured creditor in the eyes of Utopian law. 
161 Lightning v. Lightning Electrical Contractors Ltd, 23 April 1998 (unreported).  
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situs would lead to ‘bizarre results’ if the assets involved land in more than one jurisdiction as ‘the 
consequences of the same arrangement might then be different in relation to the different properties 
acquired.’162  
Let us say that A transfers land located in different jurisdictions to B pursuant to a failed contract. 
A then alleges that the properties are held on trust for him. Here, the importance of paying heed to the lex 
situs makes the splitting up of the consequential resulting or constructive trust not so much ‘bizarre’ as 
necessary. The issue as to whether A has a beneficial right in each parcel of land ultimately has to be 
decided in conformity with the lex situs of each state respectively.   
This imperative is admittedly less when the assets concerned are movables. However, as a matter 
of principle, since questions of title are proprietary in nature, it is suggested that the respective property 
choice of law rules should be applied when the assets, movables or immovables, or a mixture of both, are 
located in different jurisdictions. This position is consistent with the general property choice of law rules. 
The justifications for application of the lex situs when a proprietary issue is at stake should not be 
overlooked merely for the convenience of having the same law govern questions of title to different assets 
in different jurisdictions.    
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The common law choice of law rules for resulting and constructive trusts represent an area which has 
garnered too little attention from private international law lawyers. The common law is very relevant as 
the choice of law rules set out in the Hague Trusts Convention are inappropriate for resulting and 
constructive trusts and the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 fails to extend the Convention’s scope to 
foreign resulting and constructive trusts.  
                                                 
162 See also Webb v. Webb (Case No. C-294/92) [1994] I ECR 1717; [1994] Q.B. 696, Opinion of Adv. Gen. 
Darmon, para. 61. 
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It has been argued that trusts claims involve a proprietary issue at heart; this is so even for civil 
law trusts and analogues which prima facie may appear to reject the concept of the ‘beneficiary’ having a 
proprietary entitlement to the trust property. It has been submitted that one should characterise trusts 
claims in accordance with its underlying proprietary nature and hence apply the property choice of law 
rules. It has been demonstrated that such a choice of law rule is practical, jurisprudentially sound, and 
represents the best option available. 
This conclusion has particular repercussions for proprietary restitution in private international 
law. Claims for proprietary restitution are almost all in equity163 and will therefore involve trusts claims. 
As discussed earlier, some have asserted that the unjust enrichment choice of law rules should apply as it 
is argued that resulting and constructive trusts are imposed to reverse unjust enrichment.164 Others would 
instead argue that proprietary restitution forms a separate category which is independent of unjust 
enrichment.165 However, the choice of law rules for proprietary restitution are not clear.166 In view of all 
this uncertainty, debates as to the correct cause of action for such claims or taxonomy of the law of 
restitution should be marginalised when determining the applicable choice of law rules. At the heart of 
trusts claims is the issue of whether property is impressed with a trust, that is, whether someone has 
absolute title over property. This is an essentially proprietary issue and should be categorised as such for 
choice of law purposes. It may well be that upon the application of the property choice of law rules, the 
lex situs will thereon dictate that unjust enrichment has to be established before a trust arises; but this is 
an issue to be determined by the lex situs as the lex causae, and should not be an issue at the choice of law 
stage. The approach suggested here, that is, choosing to characterise the response, has the added 
advantage of side-stepping the problems caused by the state of flux within the law of restitution.   
                                                 
163 Panagopoulous, supra, fn 28, p. 67. 
164 Panagopoulous, ibid., pp. 66-76. 
165 Virgo, supra, fn 32, Chapter 20.  
166 This category has been ignored in Dicey and Morris’s Rule 200, para. 34R-001, p. 1485, and Article 9 of the 
proposed Rome II Regulation, COM (2003) 427. Both formulations seem to be based on the idea of the law of 
restitution as comprising solely of personal obligations to make restitution in order to reverse the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment. Although Rule 200(2)(b) offers a role for the lex situs with respect to a restitutionary obligation arising 
in connection with a transaction concerning land, it is clear from the explanatory text that this is aimed at a personal 
obligation arising from ownership of land and not questions of title over the land : para. 34-028, p. 1497.   
